Abstract: I study a married couple's investment in education when the monetary rewards from this activity accrue asymmetrically to the spouses across time and there is a possibility of unilateral divorce. If each spouse maximizes personal income, the equilibrium is inefficient. Motivated by findings in experimental economics and social psychology, I use psychological game theory to add an emotional guilt effect to the basic model. Multiple belief-dependent equilibria become possible. Some marriages still have inefficient under-investment; in some the outcome is efficient and yet there is no divorce. With a high enough guilt sensitivity, a lifelong efficient marriage is the unique equilibrium because a spouse may signal a trust in a life-long marriage so strong as to force the partner to hold beliefs which make divorce unattractive. The results have some bearing also on other partnerships than marriage.
I. Introduction
Married couples making human capital investments often concentrate on developing one spouse's skills more than the other's. At first glance this may seem profitable. 1 However, a closer game theoretic scrutiny suggests that such arrangements are hard to sustain: Suppose a wife supports her husband towards a very lucrative specialist education, instead of making a moderately remunerative investment in her own schooling. Once the husband receives his valuable degree he has an incentive to divorce his wife, reaping the benefits from his enhanced earnings capacity all by himself. Of course, a clever wife anticipates such opportunistic behavior, and therefore invests in her own schooling. Specialization is not "subgame perfect", and an inefficent outcome may result.
This dismal story reflects an implicit assumption that the spouses are motivated solely to maximize personal income. Such an assumption is often accepted in economics, but in the current context two sets of results suggest that it needs to be appended. First, some recent work in experimental economics concern games in which the structure resembles the situation with the investing spouses, and subjects often nevertheless manage to bring about efficient outcomes (see for example Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe (1995) , Fehr, Gächter & Kirchsteiger (1997) , Dufwenberg & Gneezy (1999) ). It seems clear that people do not selfishly maximize their personal income, but rather have some complementary objectives. The second set of results is suggestive of just what motivational force may be relevant in the context of marriage, or at least one such force. Recent findings based on autobiographical accounts by Baumeister, Wotman & Stillwell (1993) document that a person who rejects a relationship partner often suffers from guilt, and Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton (1994; 1995, p 174) report that "the prototypical cause of guilt is inflicting harm or distress on a relationship partner".
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how guilt may affect the problem of efficient marital investment in a model which explicitly admits opportunistic divorce. I describe explicitly both how decisions are taken across time and how guilt affects payoff perceptions and behavior. The first issue can be handled using game theory. However, accomodating the second one is more tricky. Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti's (1989) (henceforth GPS) argue that standard games are unsuitable tools for incorporating emotions in strategic situations. The problem is that standard games mandates that players' payoffs depend only on what strategy profile is played, while many emotions depend directly on the beliefs that the players harbour.
In response, GPS develop the theory of psychological games. I shall now argue that the guilt felt by a divorcer is likely to be a belief-dependent emotion, and propose that psychological game theory provides adequate tools for treating the problem at hand.
Suppose a husband divorces his wife, despite each spouse having vowed not to pursue opportunistic divorce. 2 In line with the finding by Baumeister et al cited above, it is reasonable to expect the husband to feel guilty to the extent that he believes he "inflicts harm" on his wife.
That harm should depend on the wife's beliefs, since the stronger she believes that the marriage will last the worse off she will be following a divorce relative to her expected payoff before divorce. 3 Effectively, this leads to the assumption that the stronger the husband believes that his wife believes that he will stay in the marriage, the more guilty he feels by divorcing her.
Note that a belief about a belief here directly motivates the husband in his decision making.
Psychological game theory is called for! As a starting point for my analysis I design a marital investment game in which the given payoffs reflect the spouses' personal incomes only. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium is an inefficent outcome with low marital investment. I then incorporate a "guilt effect" along the lines described above, creating a psychological marital investment game. In this case a multitude of equilibria are possible if the husband is moderately sensitive to guilt, 2 I will throughout phrase the presentation in terms of an educated husband with a supporting wife. This asymmetric treatment of the sexes is consistent with Weitzman's (1986, p 67) observation that "[h]usbands and wives typically invest in careers-most particularly in the husband's education and career-and the products of such investments are often a family's major assets", with Borenstein & Courant's (1989, footnote 3) observation that a medical student with a supporting spouse typically is a husband with a wife, with evidence concerning divorce cases decided in U.S. courts (Polsby & Zelder, 1994, footnote 4) , and with Cohen's (1987) general finding that nuptial gains tend to accrue to men early on in a marriage and to women towards the end. and which one obtains depends crucially on what expectations the spouses harbour. One equilibrium is still inefficient, with low marital investment and a husband ready to divorce his wife if given the chance. However, there is also an efficient equilibrium with high marital investment and justified full belief in a life-long marriage.
If the husband's guilt sensitivity is very high, I argue that only the equilibrium with a life-long marriage is viable. This is because by agreeing to support her husband the wife "signals" a certain degree of belief that the husband will not divorce her. The husband realizes this and is "forced" to hold a corresponding belief about his wife's belief about his choice. With a high enough guilt sensitivity he would feel exceedingly guilty pursuing divorce. The wife understands this logic of "psychological forward induction", and hence she is quite happy to support her husband.... In the end, a happy outcome is brought about which reflects on Leith & Baumeister's (1998, p 1) assertion that "guilt serves many adaptive, beneficial, and prosocial functions", and that "guilt helps strengthen and maintain close relationships" (p 2).
These results may have some bearing on other partnerships than marriage. A guilt effect similar to that modeled here can potentially explain the aforementioned experimental results. 4 Moreover, such an emotional "safeguard" (to allude to a term used by Williamson (1989, p 167) ) against opportunistic behavior may also be relevant in many other real world contexts. Situations in which the strategic possibilities and monetary incentives resemble the marital investment game may include business ventures, employment relationships, when an inventor presents a new idea to a potential producer, or in athletic or musical sponsoring when a young athlete is financially supported in his early career with the implicit understanding that the sponsor will get reimbursed if the prodigy becomes a successful professional. However, emotional concerns are more likely to be important in some partnerships than in others.
Perhaps in marriages, where monetary transfer between the partners are not very prevalent, these are particularly salient.
As regards related literature, Borenstein & Courant (1989) analyze how various kinds of divorce legislation affect marital investments, efficiency, and equity. As their focus is on the legal issues, they make less elaborate behavioral assumptions. By assumption the supporting spouse forms quite naive expectations, acting as if the probability of divorce is zero. By contrast, in the model below assumptions regarding the spouses rationality have not been relaxed. They make marital investments or divorce whenever such actions maximize expected utility. Each decision is required to be time consistent, meaning that it is optimal at the time it is taken for some belief with a reasonable foundation. Outside family economics, Huang & Wu (1994) use psychological game theory to study corruption in principal-agent relationships.
They incorporate "remorse" similarly as I model guilt, but they do not focus on the phenomena of belief signaling and psychological forward induction.
It should be stressed that my aim in this paper is not to explain why and when divorces occur as a general matter. The only reason why the possibility of divorce figures prominently in the analysis is that this has great bearing on the real problem under study: time consistent marital investment. I return to this point below (Sections II and IV.A) where I also comment on some specific aspects of real life divorce that are not present in the analysis. It should also be stressed that while I attempt to treat the phenomenon of divorcer guilt in a rigorous fashion, I do abstract from many other emotions and situational features that may be relevant too. I shall return also to this point below (Section IV.C).
The paper is structured as follows. Section II contains the benchmark model of a marital investment game with selfish spouses who are unaffected by guilt. Such an emotion is incorporated in Section III, which is the main part of the paper. Section IV contains a discussion of some points that relate to the foregoing results: why the model does not explain real life divorce behavior, how the model connects to experimental work, and important omissions and possible extensions. Section V concludes. 
Bad match

No
Consider the extensive game Γ 1 which models the following situation: First, Nature determines the quality of a married couple's match (according to some exogenouly given probability distribution). With a Bad match, the spouses agree to separate and the end node where payoffs have not been specified is reached. With a Good match, the spouses must decide on investments in education, and the wife is temporarily in control. The default outcome is that each spouse makes a moderate investment in her-or himself, but the wife may also let her husband pursue a very profitable education. If she says No to supporting her husband, each spouse's lifetime income will be one monetary payoff unit. If she says Yes to supporting her husband, she foregoes the opportunity to invest in herself. Her personal lifetime earnings will then be zero, but the husband's lifetime earnings are quadrupled. To say Yes is a good choice for the wife if the husband subsequently decides to Stay with her and split his income.
However, the husband also has the option to Divorce his wife and reap all earnings by himself, in which case the wife would be best off saying No. Of course, when they married he vowed not to act so opportunistically. However, it is here understood that a "no-fault" divorce legislation applies under which the husband can walk out of the marriage without his wife's consent, and that in the benchmark case there is no sanction involved. 5
5 Over the past twenty-five years, no-fault has become the most common sort of divorce legislation in the western world. This trend is reflected e.g. in Price & McKenry's (1988, Chapter 6 ) account of the history of U.S. divorce legislation. See Nakonezny, Shull & Rodgers (1995) and Friedberg (1998) how the introduction of no-fault divorce law has affected divorce rates in the U.S. For a penetrating discussion of the virtues and drawbacks of many different kinds of divorce legislation, see Cohen (1987) .
It may seem that the spouses could profit from signing some clever prenuptial agreements. I will, however, in this paper not discuss such contracts. This can be justified in at least two ways: First, contracts may be avoided because they are too costly, financially or even emotionally. As noted by Cohen (1987, p 291) , explicit discussion of marriage contracts may be considered "indelicate during courtship". Second, as argued by Ulph (1988) , even if one wishes to admit (Nash) bargaining it seems reasonable that the relevant threat points are determined by a non-cooperative solution, a clear understanding of which then is crucial to the bargaining process.
III. Adding guilt
In standard games a player's payoff depends only on what strategy profile is played, and not on the player's belief. GPS argue, however, that when emotions matter in strategic situations it is often the case that beliefs directly influence payoffs. In order to deal with such issues, they develop the theory of psychological games.
It is easy to imagine ways in which a divorce may evoke emotions which depend on beliefs: When a husband suddenly divorces his wife it is possible that the stronger the wife believed that her husband would stay, the more disappointed she is. The stronger the husband believes that his wife believes that he will stay, the more gratifying he may find it to do so. The husband may be averse to letting a trusting wife down, and the stronger he believes that she believes that he will stay the more guilty he feels by forcing divorce. In the Introduction it was argued that the last of these cases may be relevant to the situation modeled in Γ 1 . In Section III.A, the marital investment game Γ 1 will therefore be modified into a psychological marital investment game Γ 2 which incorporates an effect of divorcer guilt. The first stage where Nature moves is no longer explicitly given. Γ 2 is solved in Sections III.B-C.
A. A psychological marital investment game
In the psychological marital investment game Γ 2 to be constructed, the spouses have the same strategy sets as in Γ 1 and they move in the same order. In Γ 1 the unique solution involved pure strategies but in what follows mixed strategies may be relevant. Moreover, beliefs in the form of certain expectations are important. Some new notation is needed in order to represent mixed strategies, to formalize the psychological assumption that will be used, and to calculate equilibrium behavior. The spouses' actions will be denoted as follows:
is the probability with which the wife says Yes
is the probability with which the husband Stays Some data concerning the spouses' beliefs, will be denoted as follows:
These expectations are part of the beliefs the spouses hold when making their respective choices. They play a crucial role when the psychological marital investment game below is solved. Note that τ' is interpreted as the wife's trust. There is a large literature (spanning many fields) which attempts to define and analyze the notion of trust. The usage of the term here (recall the husband's vow from the presentation of Γ 1 ) is consistent with that of Rotter (1980) who defines (interpersonal) trust as an "expectancy held by an individual that the word, promise, oral or written statement of another individual or group can be relied on" (p 1).
The second-order expectation τ'', interpreted as the husband's belief in his wife's trust, is used to model an "emotion". Specifically, the following assumption will be made:
ASSUMPTION 1 (psychological): When the husband makes his choice, the stronger he expects that his wife trusts him to Stay the more disutility of guilt he experiences by choosing Divorce.
That is, if the (Yes, Divorce) profile is implemented, the husband's utility is decreasing in τ''.
Assumption 1 reflects the idea that the husband is averse to letting his trusting wife down. I argued in the Introduction that this idea is consistent with findings in social psychology. One can certainly conceive of some other motivational concerns that may have a bearing on the problem under study, and some of these are discussed in Section IV.C. However, for simplicity and clarity, the only way in which the transition from Γ 1 to Γ 2 involves a change in the spouses motivation is via Assumption 1. The following assumption only governs more specifically how this is implemented:
ASSUMPTION 2 (technical): The "guilt effect" of Assumption 1 enters additively into the husband's utility function. The husband's "guilt sensitivity", is constant at γ≥0. Note that if γ=0, the payoffs in Γ 2 collapse to those in Γ 1 . Staying a dominant choice. Rabin (1993) raises the issue that effects of this nature may obtain in psychological games, although he does not deal explicitly with games with a dynamic structure. He asks: "can players 'force' emotions; that is, can a first mover do something that will compel a second mover to regard him positively?" The example discussed here illustrates that the answer to this question may be affirmative.
The reader may verify that an analogous psychological forward induction argument can be applied whenever γ>4, but not for lower values of γ. Consider, for example, the case where γ=3. Again, the trust signaled by the wife equals ½. However, the husband is now not forced to hold a belief that makes Stay a dominant choice (since 4-3 . ½>2), so it seems that a Divorce is not out of the question. On the other hand, nothing seems to exclude the possibility that τ'' takes a value such that 4-3 . τ''<2, so it seems that also his choice to Stay can be justified. In standard games payoffs depend on actions chosen only, and it is therefore not necessary to explicitly write down the requirement that beliefs are correct in equilibrium, even if this is usually implicitly understood to be the case. The spirit of subgame perfection entails that players optimize at all decision nodes given their correct beliefs about one another's actions. In Γ 2 , however, the husbands' payoff depends directly on τ'', and it is necessary to impose explicitly that the beliefs τ' and τ'' are correct in equilibrium. To this end, note that given τ'', Γ 2 has real numbers characterizing payoffs at each endnode. In this sense, it reduces to a "standard game", to be denoted Γ 2 (τ''). A time consistent equilibrium solution of Γ 2 must fulfill three requirements: First, the spouses must optimize at all decision nodes given their beliefs and choices. This means that they must play a subgame perfect equilibrium in Γ 2 (τ'').
Second, the beliefs must be consistent what is actually happening, so that τ''=τ'=τ. 6 Third, the 6 GPS impose explicitly the strong restriction that equilibrium profiles be common knowledge. It simplifies the presentation, and affects no conclucion in the current context, to be explicit only about those parts of the equilibrium must be impregnable to a psychological forward induction argument as sketched in the previous section.
The following definition, in which (σ,τ) denotes the strategy profile in which the wife says Yes with probability σ and the husband Divorces with probability τ, imposes these requirements formally:
Condition (i) ½, and so condition (iii) captures the idea that he must choose to Stay whenever γ>4.
The Definition will now be used to solve Γ 2 for different values of γ. It is convenient to group the marital equilibria into three qualitatively different cases:
1. THE SUSPICIOUS SPOUSES (NO, DIVORCE): In this equilibrium the spouses choose the same strategies as in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game Γ 1 without emotions. The equilibrium exists whenever γ∈ [0, 4] , and it is the unique equilibrium whenever γ∈[0,2). The spouses do not trust each other at all and there will be no marriage. The equilibrium entails that τ''=τ'=τ=0.
players' beliefs which have a direct bearing on some players' payoff perception. Only τ'' appears at an end node in Γ 2 , and therefore τ''= τ'= τ is the only explicit restriction on beliefs that is made.
THE TRUSTING TWOSOME (YES, STAY):
This equilibrium exists whenever γ≥2 and it is the unique equilibrium whenever γ>4. It entails that τ''=τ'=τ=1. There is "full trust" and the spouses live happily ever after. The payoffs are (2,2), which Pareto dominates the suspicious spouses equilibrium in which payoffs are only (1,1). This solution invites two further comments. First, the emotional effects modeled in Section III could not have been adequately captured using standard, non-psychological, game theory. In any standard extensive game with the same tree as Γ 1 or Γ 2 , subgame perfect equilibrium choices can be determined by backward induction. If in such a game the husband strictly prefers to Divorce, there cannot also be a subgame perfect equilibrium where he Stays.
Contrast this with the case of Γ 2 with γ∈(2,4). In the suspicious spouses equilibrium the husband strictly prefers to Divorce, and yet there is also the trusting twosome equilibrium where he strictly prefers to Stay. Neither of these equilibria can be identified using backward induction, since the optimal choice for the husband at his node depends on τ''. In GPS' words (p 63), "in psychological games...a node...does not capture adequately the state of a game: the node identifies a history of play, but not the players' beliefs."
Second, it is noteworthy that a unique equilibrium outcome is implied when γ>4. It is the psychological forward induction requirement imposed via condition (iii) of the definition of a marital equilibrium that is responsible for this. The reader familiar with GPS' work may have wondered why their notion of a "subgame perfect psychological equilibrium" is not applied to Γ 2 . The answer is that GPS' theory is not adequate for capturing the logic of psychological forward induction. They restrict attention to psychological games where only initial (pre-play)
beliefs are allowed to directly affect payoffs (although they mention on p 78 that it may be desirable to consider alternatives). This restriction makes a forward induction argument inconceivable-if a player is forced to revise his beliefs as play proceeds this will have no bearing on his relative valuation of different strategy profiles. By contrast, the psychological forward induction argument is built around the idea that the husband's payoff depends on his belief at the time he moves (as specified in Assumption 1), and the solution concept of marital equilibrium takes this into account.
IV. Discussion
A. Divorce
The objective of this paper is to investigate how the presence of a psychological guilt effect influences marital investment behavior in a context which admits unilateral divorce and where the investment gains accrue asymmetrically to the spouses across time. The object is not to explain why divorces occur in general, even though the possibility of divorce figures explicitly in the marital investment game. This was discussed already in Section II, where a move by nature was incorporated explicitly in Γ 1 in order to underscore this fact. However, it would be unreasonable to claim that incorporating this move is sufficient for "explaining divorce".
Marianne Takas (1986, p 48) tells her story which illustrates that sometimes divorces occur after marital investments have taken place:
[W]hen I got divorced my husband and I quickly agreed on financial arrangements.
... We split everything down the middle. Everything, that is, except what could be the single most lucrative asset of our marriage-his newly earned postprofessional degree. I'd put him through school, yet he would keep an earning power that had doubled while my own stood still.
It is true that the analysis of Section III admits a limited possibility of realized divorce as part of a mixed matrimony equilibrium. 8 However, this explanation of divorce appears somewhat unsatisfactory. In a mixed matrimony the husband is indifferent between Staying and
Divorcing, a conclusion which may seem contrived.
I close this section by mentioning one aspect of reality that one may wish to consider if making a serious attempt to better understand and explain divorce behavior. It is implicitly assumed in Section III that all parameters of Γ 2 are common knowledge between the two spouses. It may be more realistic to analyze a game of incomplete information. For example, one may assume that while the husband knows the value of γ, the wife has incomplete information about this parameter. With proper adjustments one can for example develop an equilibrium where the wife's a priori expectation of a life-long marriage is good enough that she agrees to support her husband, yet she may at times be unlucky and catch a husband with little guilt sensitivity who will force divorce (details of an explicit example are available on request).
There is some findings in social psychology which lend support to such an approach.
According to Tangney (1995 Tangney ( , p 1138 "there are stable individual differences in the degree to which people are prone to shame and guilt". If a person's trait is not perfectly observable to others, this justifies assuming incomplete information.
B. Experiments
As was mentioned in the Introduction, some recent experimental findings indicate that subjects who interact in games which structurally resemble the marital investment game are not motivated solely to selfishly maximize personal income. These findings were used as input for motivating the approach in this paper. However, most experimental studies collect stylized facts about behavior and do not offer explanation of what motivational forces are at work.
With the results of Section III in hand, it is now possible to return to the experimental games and argue that a guilt effect similar to the one modeled here may be relevant for understanding what goes on in the experiments. Dufwenberg & Gneezy (1999) provide some experimental support for this claim, and it may be interesting here to briefly relate some of their findings. They study the following game: Γ 3 is structurally similar to the marital investment game. In both cases the first mover may either take an inefficent outside option, or let the other player move. In Γ 3 player 2 has more choices available than the wife in the marital investment game, but in both cases the second mover decides how to split a "pie". In both cases, if the decision makers are selfish income maximizers there is a unique and inefficient subgame perfect equilibrium in which the first mover takes his outside option immediately, and the second mover would give as little as possible to the second mover if given the chance.
In the experiment most players 2 "give away" positive amounts, and the question is why. In order to draw some conclusions regarding the subjects' motivations, Dufwenberg & Gneezy actually measure some of the subjects' beliefs. The subjects are asked to make certain guesses about one another's choices and guesses, and offered rewards for accuracy in their guesswork. This allows to test for positive correlation between what subjects in the player 2 position give away, and these subjects' expectations of what subjects in the player 1 position expect to get from them. In the experimental data the correlation is .35 and significantly different from zero, a result which is consistent with a belief-dependent guilt effect.
There is a theoretical literature emerging which attempts to provide microfoundations for the behavior observed in experimental games. Two types of approaches dominate. First, there are models which assumes that decision makers are concerned with the over-all final distribution of monetary payoffs (see, e.g., Kirchsteiger (1994) , Bolton & Ockenfels (1999) , Fehr & Schmidt (1999) ). Second, there are models which assume that decision makers are motivated by "reciprocity"-they want to reward those who are "kind", and to punish those who are "unkind" (see Rabin (1993) or Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (1998) ). Falk & Fischbacher (1998) propose a model which combines these approaches. The guilt effect modeled in this paper works differently from these other approaches. 9 Given the support of Dufwenberg & Gneezy's experiment, perhaps guilt related ideas should be seriously considered for devising explanations of behavior observed also in other experiments?
C. Omissions and extensions
While I have argued that the model in this paper corresponds to a plausible situation, it is nevertheless clear that guilt is not the only conceivable reason why a wife may support her husband's investment in education. The game Γ 1 would not be the right place to start the analysis if the wife has no career opportunities investing in herself, if the wife has the right to compensation in the case of divorce, or if divorce is very costly to the husband for some other reason. Moreover, the sharp focus on guilt and time consistent decision making comes at the 9 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain these differences at lenghth but I give some indication: The approaches where motivations depend on final distributions only can be handled using standard game theory, since a player's relative valuation of different strategy profiles is independent of his beliefs. The approaches to modeling reciprocity require psychological game theory, but in a different way than is the case with Γ 3 . Loosely speaking, "adding reciprocity" to Γ 2 entails letting the husband's payoff depend on his expectation of his wife's expectation of his payoff (not hers, as in Γ 3 ). expense on some left out aspects of real life marriages that possibly are important alongside with guilt. In future research it may be interesting to embed a model with a psychological guilt effect in a richer framework which incorporates some other concerns. In the rest of this section I hint at some omitted phenomena that may be relevant in this connection.
Incomplete information and concern for fairness or reciprocity has already been mentioned in Sections IV.A-B. Sociologists typically emphasize various other non-monetary considerations seldom touched upon by economists. See for example Price & McKenry (1988, Chapter 2) or Collins & Coltrane (1991, Chapters 8, 9, 12) for interesting discussions of companionship, esteem for spouse, erotic ties, love, etc. Elster (1998) discusses how a vast array of emotions may influence economic behavior. I refer the reader to his Section 2 for an extensive listing and classification, and here mention only a specific emotion which may have particular relevance in the current context. Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton (1995) report evidence that "people who induce guilt sometimes seem to feel guilty themselves over doing so" (p 188), a phenomenon they term meta-guilt. It may be worthwhile investigate how behavior in the marital investment game is affected if such an emotion influences the wife's motivation.
The "non-material" consideration that has been discussed most frequently in the economics of the family literature is altruism, which entails that one person's well-being depends on another person's well-being. Altruism typically does not depend on beliefs, and can therefore be handled using conventional tools of economics or game theory (see, for example, Becker (1991, Chapter 8) or Stark (1995) ). However, it is conceivable that altruism and a psychological emotion like the guilt effect modeled in this paper can interplay in interesting ways if incorporated simultaneously in a model.
On a different dimension, it may be interesting to modify the spouses' strategy spaces in a marital investment game in order to analyze more complicated family situations. For example, child production could be incorporated. The presence of children may affect the payoffs that the spouses will get if they if they stay married or divorce each other. This, in turn, may have an impact on strategic behavior, fertility, and welfare.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper may be viewed as a contribution to a research programme recently promoted by Elster (1998) . He asks (p 48), "[h]ow can emotions help us explain behavior for which good explanations seem to be lacking?". I have used psychological game theory to analyze how guilt may help sustain efficient marital investment in marriage where the gains from this investment activity accrue asymmetrically to the spouses across time, and there is the possibility of opportunistic unilateral divorce. The introduction of guilt affects the nature of equilibrium play dramatically, as it may allow the spouses to benefit from efficient investment activities which would not materialize were each spouse selfishly maximizing monetary income. Behavior-wise, I have argued that both experimental evidence and casual observation of real life marriages suggests that people indeed manage to reach efficient outcomes in similar situations.
Motivation-wise, the specific guilt effect modeled was motivated with reference to findings in social psychology.
As can be sensed from Elster's (1998) article, not much research has been done which introduces emotions in economic analysis. While pinpointing which motivational amalgam really applies in some situation may be one of the ultimate goals of this line of research, when the first steps are taken into this arena it may be wise to go slowly and introduce only a limited number of carefully motivated emotional elements. Accordingly, in this paper only money and the guilt effect influence payoffs. As should be clear from Section IV, I do not by any means pretend to provide a fully realistic account of the marital investment problem under study. Yet, I hope there are two lessons to learn. First, there are insights directly related to the specific belief-dependent guilt effect being modeled. The way this arguably realistic emotion influences the outcome sheds light on interaction in real life marriages and possibly also in other partnerships. Second, I also hope to have promoted the idea that GPS' theory of psychological games is a useful tool for work on incorporating emotions in economic analysis. Many emotions depend on beliefs. I have given some examples, GPS' text contains several others, and Elster (1998, p 49) writes that "[e]motions…are triggered by beliefs". 10 Psychological 10 See also Ruffle (1999) who studies gift-giving with belief-dependent emotions. game theory, unlike standard game theory, goes to the heart of this matter by using utility functions that are defined on domains that specify beliefs in addition to strategic choices.
